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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












RISA VETRI FERMAN, Montgomery County District Attorney 
_____________ 
       
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania                                                            
District Court  No. 2-10-cv-02055 
District Judge: The Honorable John R. Padova 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
January 13, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: January 17, 2012) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
In 1986, a jury convicted Thomas Bonner of murdering August Bennick.  In 
2009, Bonner filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. Cons. 
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Stat. §§ 9541-9546, seeking access to certain evidence for the purpose of DNA 
testing.  The Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, 
denied the petition.  Bonner appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court which 
affirmed. 
 In May of 2010, Bonner filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
against Risa Vetri Ferman, the District Attorney of Montgomery County, in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
1
  He alleged 
that Ferman‟s policy of categorically opposing any request for DNA evidence 
violated his rights under the First Amendment to “meaningful access to state and 
federal courts where he could prove his actual innocence” and under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to both substantive and procedural due process.  In the ad 
damnum clause of his complaint, Bonner prayed for an order compelling the 
production of the requested DNA evidence so it could be tested.   
Ferman filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6).  During a hearing on the motion, Bonner withdrew both his First 
Amendment claim and his procedural due process claim.  He advised the District 
Court that he was asserting only the substantive due process claim.  The Court 
granted Ferman‟s motion to dismiss, concluding that Bonner‟s substantive due 
                                              
1
   In Skinner v. Switzer, the Supreme Court held “that a postconviction claim for 
DNA testing is properly pursued in a § 1983 action[,]” not a habeas petition. 
__ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011). 
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process claim failed as a matter of law in light of the Supreme Court‟s decisions in 
Skinner v. Switzer, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011), and District Attorney’s 
Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 129 S. Ct. 2308 
(2009).    
 Bonner appealed.
2
  He does not take issue with the District Court‟s 
determination that he withdrew his claims alleging violations of his First 
Amendment and procedural due process rights.  Rather, he argues that the District 
Court erred by relying on dicta in Skinner, and that neither that precedent nor 
Osborne precludes his substantive due process claim.   
 We disagree.  In Osborne, the Supreme Court acknowledged the petitioner‟s 
alternate argument seeking relief under the substantive due process clause and 
went on to address it on the merits.  557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2322.  The Court 
declined the invitation to “recognize a freestanding right to DNA evidence”  and 
concluded “that there is no such substantive due process right.”  Id.  The Court also 
explained that “[t]here is no long history of such a right” of access to state 
evidence to perform DNA testing, id., “and „[t]he mere novelty of such a claim is 
reason enough to doubt that „substantive due process‟ sustains it,‟” id. (quoting 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993)).  Subsequently, in Grier v. Klem, 591 
                                              
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We conduct de novo review of an order 
granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).  Phillips v.  Cnty. of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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F.3d 672, 678 (3d Cir. 2010), relying upon Osborne, we acknowledged that the 
petitioner had “no substantive due process right to access DNA evidence.”  The 
following year, the majority in Skinner pointed out that “Osborne rejected the 
extension of substantive due process” to the area of DNA testing “and left slim 
room for the prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him procedural 
due process.”  131 S. Ct. at 1293 (citing Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2322).  This 
authority is binding and Bonner‟s attempt to distinguish it is unavailing.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
